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We propose to review most of the foreign investment laws of Latin
America in order to establish basic differences or similarities among them-
if any-and try to determine Latin America's trends in that field. First of
all, a foreign investment law is determined by the political motivations and
the economic needs of the respective countries. You can't expect a leftist or
nationalistic government to offer many incentives to foreign investors.
Changes in political ideas and philosophies change foreign investment laws.
Since we will not discuss here the future political environment of Latin
America, we have to limit our statements to the assumption that in years to
come, until the end of this century, Latin America will follow a political
philosophy based on the principles of democracy and a pragmatic attitude
favorable to foreign investment due to the economic needs of the region.
Our subject will not cover petroleum laws related to exploration or pro-
duction of crude which are generally favorable to foreign investors due to
the exploration and production activity needs in Latin America and the
substantial amounts of capital to be invested in those risk activities. We
will neither discuss industrial incentive laws which have been established
by some of the Latin American countries for the purpose of attracting
industrial and tourist activities. These laws contain tax exonerations in
order to promote industrialization or tourism and incentives are given to
both foreign and local investors.
We will focus our comments on laws which regulate foreign investment
in general, laws that restrict, to a greater or lesser degree, the participation
of foreign capital in the business activities of the region or simply exclude
or prohibit such participation.
*Mr. Juncadella practices corporate law in Central America.
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I. Restrictions in Generalto Foreign Investments
or for Sectors of the Economy
Generally speaking the foreign investment laws make a distinction
between types of business activities to establish different regulations for
each of them. Some of the activities are reserved to the government, others
are the exclusive rights of nationals and there are sectors open to foreign
investors and to nationals. In the latter case, local participation is generally
required. That is the case under the Mexican Foreign Investment Law
(1973)1 and under Decision 242 of the Andean Pact countries. In Mexico's
case, at least 51 percent of the capital of the corporation should be con-
trolled by Mexicans 3 and for the Andean countries a majority of the capital
by local investors is a condition to enjoy the benefits of free trade between
member countries of the Cartagena Agreement or Andean Pact 4 (Vene-
zuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia). Capital control by nationals
must also be reflected in management control.- In addition, such laws gen-
erally create a monopoly for the state of some industries, including activi-
ties which have traditionally been carried out by the private sector, i.e.,
hydrocarbons and basic petrochemicals. Consequently, they constitute an
impediment to free enterprise and free competition in activities previously
carried out by the private sector.
Notwithstanding the above, governments have created mechanisms
within their governmental structure to alleviate such restrictions when the
economy of the country demands a different approach to foreign enterprise.
Mexico, as an example, has created the National Investment Commission
which is entitled to grant 100 percent participation to foreign investors in a
particular business, corporation or enterprise, if the Commission considers
it convenient for the benefit of the country.6 The Andean countries have
established several reservations within the framework of Decision 24 in
order to allow foreign participation-including total control of the business,
in some sectors of the economy.
7
There are sectors of the economy in the Andean countries with different
regulations established by some of the countries regarding foreign capital
due to the reservations made with respect to Decision 24. That situation is
confusing and even chaotic. As an illustration of this, we have the case of
Ecuador, which is applying different rules than those of Decision 24 to
insurance, commercial, banking and financial institutions and other sectors
'Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment, Diario Oficial
(DO), March 9, 1976 [hereinafter cited as Foreign Investment Law].
'Decision 24 of December 31, 1970, of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, as
amended.
'Foreign Investment Law, supra note 1, article 5.
'Decision 24, supra note 2, article 27.
'Foreign Investment Law, supra note 1, article 5.
'Id., article 5.
7Decision 24, supra note 2, article 38.
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of the economy. 8 In Bolivia's case, the investment law9 is applied to any
industrial activity within the country. That situation may be in conflict
with Decision 24.
II. Limitations to the Repatriation of
Capital and Profits
Most of the foreign investment laws establish limitations for the repatria-
tion of capital and profits. Some of them impose direct restrictions and
other indirect limitations through the mechanism of taxation on the repatri-
ation of profits or dividends.
In the case of the Andean countries, the restriction to the repatriation of
profits is a direct one. Simply, annual profits cannot be remitted in excess
of 20 percent of the registered capital.' 0 In the case of Uruguay, Argentina
and Brazil an indirect method of taxation is controlling the remittance of
profits in excess of certain percentages of the capital registered.
The Uruguayan Foreign Investment Law" guarantees repatriation of
capital and profits when the investment is registered with the government
and a contract is signed between the government and the investor. How-
ever, if the profits are in excess of 20 percent of the registered capital, a 40
percent tax is imposed on the excess.' 2 Brazil and Argentina apply a simi-
lar tax on excess profits although the tax base and rates are different. In
Brazil, the tax is 60 percent on the profits remitted in excess of 25 percent of
the registered capital, 13 and in Argentina the tax is 25 percent for the excess
of profits remitted above 20 percent of the registered capital. '
4
The above-mentioned taxes are, of course, in addition to the normal cor-
porate income tax and the normal rate imposed on remittance of profits/
dividends which must be paid without any exemption to the government.
Concerning the repatriation of capital, generally speaking, there is no
problem if the capital is duly registered. However, some countries-like
Argentina 15 and Chile '6---establish that registered capital cannot be repa-
triated until the expiration of three years starting from the date of registra-
tion with the government.
Mexico does0 not establish any limitation on the repatriation of capital
and profits. In addition, there is no exchange control in Mexico. Central
America has no foreign investment laws (only Industrial Incentive Laws,
'Decree No. 900-B of Novembver 10, 1976, Diario Oficial, November 26, 1976.
'Investment Law of Bolivia, Decree Law No. 10045 of December 10, 1971.
"
0 Decision 24, supra note 2, article 37.
"Law No. 14179 of March 28, 1974, as amended, published in the Official Daily of April 5,
1974.
"Id., article 6.
"Law No. 4131, as amended by Law No. 4390 of September 11, 1964, article 43.
"Argentina Foreign Investment Law, as amended. Revised text by Decree No. 1062-80,
article 16.
"Id., article 13.
"Decree Law No. 1748 of March 11, 1977, article 4.
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not covered herein). However, there are exchange controls and in the case
of El Salvador, the general rule, with exceptions for industrial activities
duly classified by the government, is that profits cannot be remitted in
excess of 10 percent of the registered capital.17 Panama has neither foreign
investment law nor exchange control. Consequently, the repatriation of
capital and profits is freely carried out.
Chile, although it has some time limitation for the repatriation of capital,
as mentioned before, has established a guarantee to the foreign investor on
income tax. The law guarantees 18 to the foreign investor an income tax no
higher than 49.5 percent for a ten-year period from the day the contract is
signed between the foreign investor and the government; also, a similar
guarantee in regard to indirect taxes and customs duties covers the importa-
tion of machinery and equipment necessary for the plant's production. The
law also establishes' 9 the principle that the foreign investor cannot be dis-
criminated against as compared to the local investor. A special appeal is
established by the law, 20 so that the' foreign investor may obtain the elimi-
nation of any discriminatory resolution or practice which may affect his
business activities. The access to, or use of local credit 2' would not be con-
sidered a discriminatory activity or a limitation to the foreign investor.
The Chilean law22 requests express authorization by the government:
(1) for any investment by foreign investors higher than U.S. $5 million;
(2) if the investment is to be carried out in business sectors conducted by the
government or in public services such as telecommunications; or (3) when
made by a foreign government or a public institution of such foreign gov-
ernment. The above-mentioned provisions are similar-in some respects-
to the Argentinian law23 which also requires express approval by the gov-
ernment, or an agency of the government, when the investments are in
excess of certain amount or in special sectors of the economy (i.e., energy).
The tax guarantee contained in the Chilean Foreign Investment Law
reminds us of the mathematical formula used in Peru to reflect changes in
income tax for some companies under special incentive investment laws
such as the Petroleum Law. We believe that this is a good solution adopted
by Peru to guarantee the foreign investor that the rate of return-after
taxes-is not going to change substantially if new taxes are imposed by the
government.
7Decree No. 147 of May 30, 1961, article 40.
"Decree Law No. 1748, supra note 16, article 7.
"Id., article 9.
"Id., article 10.
2 Id., article 11.
"Id., article 16.
"Argentina Foreign Investment Law, supra note 14, article 6.
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III. Comparative Income Tax Situation
Although, we are not reviewing the tax situation of foreign investment in
Latin America, it is useful to have a general knowledge of how the coun-
tries are treating foreign investment through the most direct of taxes-
income tax. In Appendix A we can see that Peru is the country with the
highest combined income tax rate (68.5 percent). The combined income tax
rate is the corporate income tax plus remittance of profits-dividend tax.
The second is Nicaragua with 67 percent, and the third is Venezuela with
60 percent. The average combined income tax rate for Latin America is
about 50 percent.
IV. Transfer of Technology
I would like to make some comments on the transfer of technology.
Mexico,24 Argentina,2 5 Brazil2 6 and the Andean countries27 have laws
related to the transfer of technology by foreigners to local businesses. In
each country there is a registry for the transfer of technology contracts. We
can consider that Argentina has the least restrictive transfer of technology
law. After the new law was enacted in Argentina in March 1981, only
agreements between affiliates for the transfer of technology are subject to
approval by the authorities.2 8  Other contracts are registered with the
authority for information purposes.29 The only penalty in the absence of
approval of a contract by the authority-case of affiliates--or lack of pre-
sentation for information purposes--case of third parties-is that the pay-
ment for the transfer of technology will not be accepted as a deduction for
income tax purposes but such payment (to foreigners) will be permitted.
However, the contracts will be considered valid from a legal point of
view. 30 The situation is not the same with the other countries in which the
contract, if not duly approved by the authority, will not be considered valid
in the country.
Excluding Argentina, with its flexible transfer of technology law, the rest
of the countries in Latin America with transfer of technology laws (Mexico,
Brazil and the Andean Pact countries) do not allow the following restric-
tions in the transfer of technology contracts:
a. Grant-back clauses which require the licensee to give up innovations
developed with the licensor's technology;
2 Law on the Registration of Transfer of Technology and Use and Exploitation of Patents
and Trademarks, (DO), December 30, 1972.21Transfer of Technology Law No. 22426 of March 12, 1981.
"
6Ato normative No. 15 of the Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial of September
11, 1975.
"Decision 24, supra note 2.28Transfer of Technology Law, supra note 25, article 2.
29Id., article 3.
3 Id., article 9.
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b. The licensee's efforts to export cannot be restricted if this adversely
affects the national interests;
c. A licensee's research and development efforts cannot be restricted;
d. The foreign supplier cannot limit the licensee's production or set sales
prices;
e. A licensee cannot be required to sign an exclusive sales or representa-
tion contract with the licensor;
f. A licensee cannot be required to submit contractual disputes to for-
eign courts;
g. A licensee cannot be required to buy equipment, tools, parts or raw
materials only from a certain supplier.
The registration of transfer of technology contracts includes not only
technical know-how, technical assistance and services related to the admin-
istration and operation of enterprises, but also agreements containing trade-
marks, licenses, and patent licenses. Another interesting aspect that is
unique in the Mexican law is that trademark license agreements relating to
the licensee's use of a foreign licensor's Mexican mark shall contain a clause
to the effect that the licensee shall also use on its Mexican-made products a
Mexican origin mark owned by the licensee. Without such a clause, the
agreement cannot be registered. 3 1 However, the obligation to use a trade-
mark of Mexican origin, together with a foreign one on articles produced in
Mexico, has been suspended for the past four years.
One additional aspect worth noting concerns the payment of commis-
sions by the licensee to the licensor for the use of technology or the payment
of royalties for the use of trademarks and/or patents. In Mexico, the Regis-
try for the Transfer of Technology generally does not authorize a payment
in excess of 3 percent of the gross sales of the licensee. In Argentina, roy-
alty payments for the use of trademarks are prohibited if the agreement is
between affiliates32 and in the Andean countries the payment of royalties
for trademarks that are not used is also prohibited.33 In Brazil, only pay-
ments up to 5 percent of the gross income of the licensee which is related to
the transfer of technology contract or the products to which the trademark
agreement refers are deductible for income tax purposes. 34 However, Bra-
zil, as in the case of Argentina, prohibits the payment of royalties for the
use of trademarks and patents when the agreement for their use is between
affiliates.35
"Law on Inventions and Trademarks, (DO), February 10, 1976, article 128.
3 Transfer of Technology Law, supra note 25, article 5.
"Decision 24, supra note 2, article 25.34Law No. 4131, as amended, supra note 13, article 12.
"Id., article 14.
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V. New Tendencies for Patents and Trademarks
Even though we will not review the Patents and Trademarks Laws, we
have to be aware of the new tendencies in Latin America concerning the
registration and use of patents and trademarks. Many of these tendencies
have been already incorporated in some legislations. As an example, Mex-
ico 36 and the Andean countries 37 prohibit the grant of patents for inven-
tions related to pharmaceutical products, medicines, foods and beverages
for human or animal use, fertilizers, plaguicides, herbicides and fungicides.
We also note a new tendency to require the actual use of patents during the
license period. Otherwise, an obligatory non-exclusive license to use the
patent may be authorized by the government if requested to do so by an
interested party. The amount of royalties payable and other terms for such
a license must be approved by the authorities. The patent will expire if a
valid request for an obligatory license is not made during the fourth or fifth
year of the patent's concession. That tendency is already contained in out-
standing legislation such as that of Mexico 38 and the Andean countries. 39
Concerning trademarks, the requirement of use as a condition for the
renewal of the trademark at the end of the concession is a general tendency
in Latin America. Also it is a tendency in countries within the framework
of Common Markets to accept the use of a trademark in any one of the
Common Market countries as evidence of use in the other countries in
order to grant renewal rights. The tendency has been confirmed in the leg-
islation of the Andean countries.
40
VI. Retroactivity versus Non-Retroactivity in
the Foreign Investment Laws
In Mexico's case, the requirement in the 1973 law for majority participa-
tion by Mexican capital does not apply retroactively to foreign investment
made prior to the law's enactment. However, new investments, new busi-
ness lines or capital increases by companies having done business even
before 1973 are affected to that extent by "Mexicanization" requirements
when made after 1973. a' The phase-out process or transformation into
national or mixed enterprises for foreign investment doing business in the
Andean countries is only a condition to enjoy the benefits of the Cartagena
Agreement. The advantages deriving from the duty-free program of the
Cartagena Agreement shall be enjoyed only by products manufactured by
national or mixed enterprises of the member countries, as well as by foreign
enterprises which are in the process of being transformed into national or
3
"Law on Inventions and Trademarks, supra note 31, article 10.
"Decision No. 85 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement dated June 5, 1974, arti-
cle 5.
3 Law on Inventions and Trademarks, supra note 31, article 48.
3 Decision No. 85, supra note 37, article 34.
'Id., article 70.
"'Foreign Investment Commission. Resolution No. 16 of July 21, 1977.
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mixed enterprises pursuant to Decision 24.42 Whether those provisions of
Decision 24 are retroactive or not has been a matter of long juridical
debate. The discussions have had some practical effects. In order to avoid
the obligation of transformation (phase-out) for foreign enterprises, some
countries of the Andean Common Market have expressly reserved some
sectors of the economy from the application of Decision 24.
In other words, although the general rule of the Mexican and the Andean
legislations regarding foreign investment is that foreign participation
should not control the majority of the capital or management of a corporate
entity, the reality due to economic situations has presented these countries
with the opportunity to allow greater participation by foreign capital. From
a pragmatic viewpoint, the question of retroactivity or non-retroactivity of
the above-mentioned laws is irrelevant due to the several exceptions to the
provisions of the laws allowed by the government.
For the rest of the Latin American countries, we have not seen any signif-
icant legal provisions related to foreign investment that might be considered
retroactive in detriment of the economic interest of the investment. The
tendency of the countries in Latin America to request local participation in
the capital or management of a corporation in new projects or economy
activities has nothing to do with retroactivity. Furthermore, the experience
has demonstrated that if the project is substantial and requires significant
capital and technology, the governments are willing to waive the require-
ments of local participation in the project since the quid pro quo obtained
by the countries from the foreign investor is much higher than the weight of
any philosophical considerations or nationalistic tendencies.
VII. Final Considerations
If we were willing to accept what we said at the beginning, that Latin
America will follow until the end of this century a political philosophy
based on the principles of democracy and a pragmatic attitude favorable to
foreign investment, due to the economic problems and needs of the region,
there may be a great opportunity for some of my ideas, which I personally
consider to be good guidelines for the treatment of foreign investment in
future legislation, to become a reality. Some of these ideas have been men-
tioned earlier and, in fact, are a reality in one or two of the foreign invest-
ment laws in our region. The rest of the ideas are not utopia and can be
incorporated in future laws. Such guidelines are:
A. Unrestricted guarantee for the foreign investor for the repatriation
of capital and profits;
B. Unrestricted guarantee for a number of years that the income tax
applicable to the foreign investor will be the tax in effect when the
"
2Decision 24, supra note 2, article 27.
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foreign investment was accepted and registered with the
government;
C. Similar guarantee with regards to taxes on dividends or remittance
of profits paid to foreign investors on investments registered with
the government;
D. Similar guarantee for indirect taxes (sales tax, consumption tax,
etc.) for raw materials and products and with regard to custom
duties for raw materials and other products not available locally
necessary for the production of articles related to the foreign
investment;
E. No price controls for products manufactured by the foreign investor
in question for a reasonable number of years;
F. No discrimination in any respect against the foreign investor.
It is obvious that there could be many other ideas, perhaps much better
than the ones we mentioned. However, they would have to be compatible
with the legal environment of the region in order to be acceptable by gov-
ernments. We, as lawyers, have an important role to play in the legislative
process of our respective countries. Consequently, we should not lose any
important opportunity that our opinion be heard within the democratic
process in order to achieve a reasonable legislation on foreign investment
which may benefit the country, or the region involved and which--on the
other hand-will be a recognition of the role and involvement of foreign


























(M) = Maximum Rate
33
30
40
48.57
40
45 (M)
20
30 (M)
48 (M)
40 (M)
42 (M)
40 (M)
50 (M)
30 (M)
55 (M)
38 (M)
25
50 (M)
Tax on Dividends/
Remittance of Profits
17.50
30
25
20
15
40
22
12.1
15
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45
10
10
30
20
Combined Rate
44.725
51.00
55.00
48.57
52.00
53.25
52.00
45.40
54.29
49.00
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67.00
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37.00
68.50
38.00
25.00
60.00
